


# Political Roles of the Military 2.0

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Codebook, March 08, 2018



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The Political Roles of the Military (PRM) Dataset 2.0 contains information on 120 democratic and autocratic countries for the period 1999–2016. Data are generated for 01 January of each year.

Please see “PRM\_aggregation.do” for a suggestion to generate scores for military ruler and supporter.

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Note on missings:

- 444: foreign-occupied state
- 555: states without a standing army
- 666: failed state according to BTI (average of 1.1 and  $1.4 < 3$ )
- 999: missing data

## Variable overview

<b>Identification variables</b>	<b>4</b>
codealp	3-letter country code .....4
ccodecow	Country code correlates of war .....4
country	Country name .....4
year	Year .....4
countryyear	Country year .....4
bti_region	BTI region .....4
bti_version	BTI version .....5
<b>Political roles of the military</b>	<b>5</b>
raw_origin	Regime origin.....5
raw_leader	Political leader .....5
raw_mod	Minister of defence.....6
raw_veto	Military veto-power .....6
raw_repress	Military repression.....6
raw_impun	Military impunity.....6



**bti\_version****BTI version**

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The Bertelsmann Transformation Index is released every two years. This variable indicates which BTI version was used as the basis for coding of variables referring to the BTI. Thus far, there are eight versions: BTI 2003, 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012, 2014, 2016, 2018.

References: BTI.

## Political roles of the military

**raw\_origin****Regime origin**

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Yearly measure whether a regime originates from a military background; that is, a military takeover or a civil war, and ensuing elections, if any, were according to Polity IV neither free nor fair. Assuming that the effect of a military origin diminishes after one generation we code the origin of regime spells as non-military if the regime constituting event occurred more than 25 years ago. Foreign military intervention is not considered as a military origin.

- (0) no military origin
- (1) military origin

**References:** Freedom House, BTI, USHRR, Polity IV, Powell/Thyne 2011.

**raw\_leader****Political leader**

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Yearly measure on the regime leader's connection to the armed forces.

- (0) no active member of the military/rebel leader
- (0.8) retired member of the military (excluding general draft)
- (1) active member of the military or rebel leader

**References:** DPI, Freedom House, BTI, Polity IV USHRR, other secondary sources.

**raw\_mod**

**Minister of defence**

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Yearly measure of the minister of defence's connection to the armed forces.

- (0) no active member of the military or simply no minister of defence
- (1) active member of the military

**References:** DPI, other secondary sources.

**raw\_veto**

**Military veto-power**

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Yearly measure of the military's veto-powers. This measure is based on BTI questions 2.2, *effective power to govern*, and 16.2, *anti-democratic actors* (BTI 2003-2014).

- (0) military not identified as veto-player
- (1) military identified as veto-player

**References:** BTI.

**raw\_repress**

**Military repression**

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Yearly measure of internal military deployment against opposition; this includes all de facto internal employment of the military to deter political dissent including fighting domestic insurgencies.

- (0) military not deployed internally
- (1) military deployed internally

**References:** Freedom House, BTI, USHRR.

**raw\_impun**

**Military impunity**

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Yearly measure of military impunity. The military enjoys impunity if members of the armed forces engage in illegal activities and there are no reports on prosecution and conviction, or prosecution and conviction are politically motivated, or de facto prosecution and conviction must be considered highly disproportional to the number and severity of crimes committed.

- (0) no military impunity
- (1) military impunity

**References:** USHRR.

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